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Abstract
Anomaly detection is a problem of great interest in medicine, finance, and other
fields where error and fraud need to be detected and corrected. Most deep anomaly
detection methods rely on autoencoder reconstruction error. However, we show
that this approach has limited value. First, this approach starts to perform poorly
when either noise or anomalies contaminate training data, even to a small extent.
Second, this approach cannot detect anomalous but simple to reconstruct points.
This can be seen even in relatively simple examples, such as feeding a black image
to detectors trained on MNIST digits. Here, we introduce a new discriminator-
based unsupervised Lipschitz anomaly detector (LAD). We train a Wasserstein
discriminator, similar to the ones used in GANs, to detect the difference between
the training data and corruptions of the training data. We show that this procedure
successfully detects unseen anomalies with guarantees on those that have a certain
Wasserstein distance from the data or corrupted training set. Finally, we show
results of this system in an electronic medical record dataset of HIV-positive
veterans from the veterans aging cohort study (VACS) to establish usability in a
medical setting.
1 Introduction
A common problem in real-world datasets is finding instances that are in some way different from the
others. In many domains such as health, medicine, and finance, there is a vast amount of complex
and high dimensional data, but a great scarcity in labelled data. Here, we focus on the problem of
unsupervised anomaly detection, also known as outlier detection or novelty detection. We consider
anomalous points as those that have a low likelihood of occurring in data generated from the nominal
distribution. This suggests a density estimation based solution, but a majority of the work on anomaly
detection in real-world datasets is not directly density based because of the difficulty in density
estimation in high dimensional spaces. In structured feature spaces such as images, deep networks
are the state of the art in a wide variety of tasks, so it is useful to consider deep or network based
approaches to anomaly detection for these data types. A great majority of the neural network literature
on anomaly detection uses an autoencoder to model the distribution of nominal data, with the idea
that given a correctly sized bottleneck, the reconstruction error on training points will be much
lower than on points not in the training set, i.e. anomalies. However, this has two major drawbacks:
1. reconstruction error does not model the data density well, and 2. it is not robust to training set
contamination, i.e., when a few anomalous points are added to the training data. Here, we propose a
new discriminator-based model that does not rely on reconstruction error, but rather on a discriminator
network from the Wasserstein GAN framework [1].
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We use a method that explicitly encourages low anomaly score over the training data, and high
function values over a corruption of the data. In our framework, we take training data, corrupt the
training data, and learn a discriminator between this corruption process and the normal data. We use a
Lipschitz constraint on our discriminator network so that points that are close together are guaranteed
to have similar scores, which cannot be guaranteed by other methods. Further, this constraint and the
Kantorovich-Rubenstein duality allows us to make guarantees in terms of the Wasserstein-1 distance.
This interpretation allows us to bound the difference between the expectation of our scoring function
on the anomalous data and the training data by the closeness of this corruption process to the true
anomaly distribution. Further, this allows us to put a strong prior on the distribution of anomalous
points, which is not possible in other deep methods, or to use a more uninformative prior and still
maintain guarantees (at least for the optima of our optimization) on points that are far from the normal
data.
An anomaly detection algorithm should be robust to a small amount of anomalous training data.
Previous work considers a contamination value γ ∈ [0, 0.5) that represents an upperbound on the
fraction of points in the training set that are anomalous [2, 3, 4, 5]. However, we show that previous
deep methods are not able to handle training set contamination (i.e. γ > 0). Suppose that the anomaly
distribution contains a concentration of similar points. Then, if even one of these points is added
to the training data of an autoencoder, the autoencoder will learn to reconstruct all of these similar
points fairly well even if this is a relatively small fraction of the training data, since it is trained to
minimize mean squared error, which is sensitive to outliers. Our method is stable to these additions
because it explicitly takes into account the data density of the training distribution in the score.
We make the following contributions. First, in Section 4 we formulate and introduce a new Lipschitz
constrained anomaly discriminator framework. Second, in Section 5 we provide robustness and
approximation guarantees over the solution to our optimization. Finally, in Section 6 we present
experimental results showing significant outperformance on a corrupted training set anomaly detection
task.
2 Related Work
Existing methods generally fall into two categories model or distance based. Within model based
anomaly detection we can further make the distinction between methods that score test points based
on reconstruction, and those that attempt to directly estimate the data density.
Two examples of model based algorithms are one-class support vector machines (OC-SVM), which
learns a half-space separating the data from the origin, and support vector data description (SVDD),
which learns the smallest hypersphere surround the data [3, 6]. Other methods based on truncated
PCA or its variants use reconstruction error on a truncated basis of the data [7, 8]. The main drawback
to these methods is their poor performance in high dimensional datasets. In recent years, many
deep methods attempt to generalize these objectives to neural networks as a way of overcoming this
problem in the image domain.
Autoencoder based models use an autoencoder or variant to estimate density by either using the
learned embedding and using a linear model [9, 10] or by taking the reconstruction loss of a test
point [11, 12]. A few works take a step further and generalize objectives used in linear methods to
the autoencoder setting. Chalapathy et al. [13] generalize the robust PCA objective. Ruff et al. [5]
generalize the SVDD objective. Chalapathy et al. [14] generalize the OC-SVM objective. Abati et al.
[15] add an autoregressive loss to the reconstruction loss. For a recent survey see [16]. However,
in this work we show that rely on reconstruction error is not a good proxy for data density (see
Figure 2) and is not robust, as some datapoints are less difficult to reconstruct than others (See
Table 1). Furthermore, our model is the first that can be thought of generalizing distance based
anomaly detection to neural networks.
A number of GAN based methods have been suggested for anomaly detection primarily for a slightly
different task, detecting anomalous areas within a test image. Schlegl et al. [17] uses a reconstruction
error based on the Bi-GAN [18] architecture. Ravanbakhsh et al. [19] also uses reconstruction
error for anomaly detection in videos. Pidhorskyi et al. [20], Perera et al. [21] use adversarial
autoencoder [22] based approaches and a probabilistic interpretation of the latent space. However,
these methods are designed to detect anomalies within test points by highlighting anomalous regions
of a test image, and as such are not optimized for point-wise anomaly detection (See Table S3).
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Out of the GAN methods, Sabokrou et al. [23] is the most similar method to our work, as they also
uses the discriminator of a GAN as their anomaly scoring function. Their method could be restated
as training a denoising convolutional autoencoder (DCAE) [24] followed by a discriminator loss
between its output (fake) and its input (real). We note three advantages of our method over [23]. (1)
We do not need to train a generator network avoiding the many difficulties in training of adversarial
networks [25]. (2) We use a Lipschitz discriminator guaranteeing that points that are close together
receive similar scores. (3) We do not use a reconstruction based loss, which biases nominal points
towards those that are easy to reconstruct, and not those that are close to training points. By using a
Lipschitz constrained network we use a distance interpretation unlike any previous deep method.
More traditional non-network based methods for anomaly detection often use a distance based
estimation of density. These methods use a K-NN approach for determining anomalies and have
been shown to work well in a wide variety of settings. These methods attempt to estimate the local
density of a point either relative to its neighbors as in [2] or to the entire dataset as in [26]. These
methods have been shown to perform quite well on a variety of tasks [27, 28]. However, these
methods require a k-nearest neighbor query, which requires at least O(n log n) time and at least O(n)
space using spatial indexing structures [29]. In this work, we generalize a distance based method
to the network domain showing both theoretical and empirical benefits over existing deep anomaly
detection methods.
3 Background
We provide background on the formulation of anomaly detection, and related distance based unsuper-
vised anomaly detectors.
Standard Formulation Given samples from some nominal probability distribution P over X , the
density level set formulation can be seen as the following. Given some α > 0 we wish to produce
c : X → {0, 1} such that c(x) = [[p(x) > α]] where α is either predefined using some absolute
density level or in relation to some quantile of the training data controlling the false positive error [26].
Existing methods use a corruption parameter γ ∈ [0, 0.5) to set α, based on scores on the training
data. Thus the difficult part is modeling p(x), and the standard formulation of anomaly detection
reduces to building a model with a good estimate of the true nominal data distribution given a finite
training set.
Distance Based Anomaly Detection A number of methods use a distance based approach for
anomaly detection [2, 30, 31, 26]. The larger the distance to the k-nearest neighbor, the lower the
density at a point and the more likely it is to be an outlier. Our method is similar to the method in
[32], which scores a point based on the sum of distances to its k-nearest neighbors.
Wasserstein Metric Recently, interest has increased in the use of transportation metrics, such as the
Wasserstein metric, to train neural networks. The Wasserstein GAN [1] and later works, such as [33],
showed both empirically and theoretically, the advantages of training generative adversarial networks
or GANs with a Wasserstein based loss. The Wasserstein-1 metric, also known as Earth-mover
distance, between two distributions P,Q defined over Rn with some distance metric d over Rn is:
W (P,Q) = inf
pi∈Π(P,Q)
E(x,y)∼pi
[
d(x, y)
]
(1)
This can be thought of the minimum amount of work required to move one pile of dirt (P ) to another
(Q). However, the optimization over the infimum is intractable. By the Kantorovich-Rubinstein
duality [34] for the euclidean distance metric, i.e., d(x, y) = ‖x− y‖,
W (P,Q) = sup
‖f‖L≤1
Ex∼P f(x)− Ex∼Qf(x) (2)
By constraining the network to be 1-Lipschitz we can, by gradient descent, approximate the Wasser-
stein distance between two distributions for which we only have samples. In our method, Lipschitz
anomaly discriminator, we utilize the extensive work that has gone into effective learning of Lipschitz
constrained networks, in the anomaly detection domain.
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Figure 1: Our Lipschitz anomaly discriminator (LAD) trains a Lipschitz neural network f to
discriminate between the data Pn and a corrupted version of the data in this case P̂a = Pn +N(0, σ).
Our trained network f∗ is then used to score anomalies. Darker = more anomalous in this figure.
4 The Lipschitz Anomaly Discriminator Framework
We propose to learn an anomaly scoring function f as the output of a neural network we call the
Lipschitz Anomaly Discriminator (LAD) framework. Our neural network function f is trained to
maximally discriminate between nominal training data Pn, and a corrupted version of the training
data P̂a. Since we are tackling the unsupervised anomaly detection problem, we use a corrupted
version of the training data as a substitute for the true (unknown) distribution of anomalous points Pa
(See Figure 1).
Rather than using an ordinary discriminator as in the standard GAN framework, we use a Lipschitz
constrained network as in [1] because this allows us to directly optimize for low normality scores on
low density points on Pn and high normality scores on high density points. Furthermore, as shown in
[1], a K-Lipschitz neural network optimized to discriminate between two sampleable distributions
has a convenient formulation in terms of the Wasserstein distance and the Kantorovich-Rubenstein
duality [34]. Note that we do not use the generator from the [1], but rather only the discriminator. We
use the training data, and generate a corrupted distribution by sampling from some other distribution
P̂a, meant to model the anomaly distribution as closely as possible. While we could use the samples
of a generator to model P̂a, we found more success using a simple corruption process. This is
explored further in Appendix D. We use the gradient penalty formulation in WGAN-GP [33] to
optimize our objective, given by:
L = Ex∼Pn
[
f(x)
]− E
x∼P̂a
[
f(x)
]
+ λEx∼Px
[
(‖∇xf(x)‖2 − 1)2
]
, (3)
where Px is obtained by sampling uniformly along straight lines between pairs of points sampled
from P̂a and Pn. We use λ = 10 as suggested in the original work.
4.1 Estimating the Anomaly Distribution
The choice of the anomaly distribution to train against is important and useful in building inductive
bias into the model. Existing models implicitly build in an assumption on the anomaly distribution.
For example, autoencoder or GAN reconstruction based models assume that anomalies will be
difficult to reconstruct using a model trained on normal data.
We show that the difference in the average score on the true anomalies and the average score on the
true normal is bounded from above by the Wasserstein distance between the true anomaly distribution
and the estimate of the anomaly distribution (see Eq. 4). Practically, this means that the better the
estimate of the anomaly distribution, the better the performance of LAD.
In our test cases, we choose Gaussian noise on the artificial cases, and shuffle patches on MNIST
digits. In general, it is important to mimic the anomaly generation mechanism in some way that may
be domain dependent.
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4.2 Training Set Contamination
The standard anomaly detection task assumes access to training samples sampled i.i.d. from some
nominal probability distribution, which is unrealistic in a big data setting. As dataset size increases,
the cost of removing all anomalies from the data also increases. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
in large datasets, where deep neural networks are most effective, that there will be a few anomalies
left in the training set. It is then important for deep anomaly detection methods to be robust to a small
amount of contamination of the training set with anomalies.
Formally, we consider the problem where samples are drawn from a mixture of the nominal probability
distribution Pn and the anomalous distribution Pa. That is we are given n samples {xi}ni=1 drawn
i.i.d. from the probability distribution (1− γ)Pn + γPa, where γ ∈ (0, 1) and γ  1 represents the
anomaly contamination. We show that while existing deep anomaly detection methods perform well
on clean training data (i.e., γ = 0) they are very sensitive to even a small amount of contamination of
the training set.
5 Theoretical Evaluation
As is apparent in Figure 2, for reconstruction-based anomaly detection methods, we are not guaranteed
to correctly predict anomalous points even for points that are very far from the support of the nominal
data distribution. On the other hand, our Wasserstein distance-based method does not suffer from this
instability. We formalize this in our first proposition. Intuitively, points sufficiently far away from the
data will have a higher anomaly score than any point in the data. For proofs see Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Let f∗ be the optimal solution of sup‖f‖L≤1 (Ex∼Pn [f(x)]− Ey∼Pa [f(y)]), and
let pi be the optimal coupling between Pn and Pa, defined as the minimizer of W (Pn, Pa) =
infpi∈Π(Pn,Pa) E(x,y)∼pi[‖x− y‖] where Π(Pn, Pa) is the set of joint distributions whose marginals
are Pn and Pa, respectively. If Pn has a compact support Sn and Pa has compact support Sa, then
there exists C > 0 such that f∗(y) ≤ C − infx∈Sn{‖x− y‖} for Pa-almost every y.
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of Prop. 1, there exists R > 0 such that for Pa-almost every y, if
infx∈Sn ‖y − x‖ > R then f∗(y) < f∗(x) for Pn-almost every x.
The next item we would like to address is robustness to corruption of the training set. Suppose our
training set is corrupted with a fraction γ > 0 of anomalous datapoints, then our method should
still effectively distinguish between nominal and anomalous datapoints. Intuitively, this is the case
as the loss for our network depends on an absolute error, unlike the squared error in, for example,
autoencoder reconstruction error. We show that if our corruption process follows the distribution
of anomalies (i.e., P̂a = Pa) then the change in the difference of expectation over the nominal and
anomalous points is bounded.
Proposition 2. Let f (A,B) denote the optimal solution to max‖f‖L≤1 Ex∼Af(x)− Ex∼Bf(x), and
in particular let f∗ = f (Pn,Pa) and f∗∗ = f ((1−γ)Pn+γPa,Pa). Then, under the same conditions as
Prop. 1,∣∣Ex∼Pn [f∗(x)− f∗∗(x)] + Ex∼Pa [f∗∗(x)− f∗(x)]∣∣ ≤ 11− γW (Pn, (1− γ)Pn + γPa)
This result can be thought of bounding the increase of score on the anomaly points and the decrease
of score on the normal points (or vice versa) when the training set is corrupted by the addition of
anomalies to it, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 represents the amount corruption. Since this is bounded, we know
that the optimal function does not change much in expectation on the nominal versus anomalous
points.
Finally, we would like to bound the difference between the optimal discriminator function and
the one learned by our estimate P̂a of the unknown true Pa. We note that this can be achieved
directly from the triangle inequality over the Wasserstein distance. Indeed, since both W (Pn, Pa) ≤
W (Pa, P̂a) +W (P̂a, Pn) and W (Pn, P̂a) ≤W (Pn, Pa) +W (Pa, P̂a), then
|W (Pn, Pa)−W (Pn, P̂a)| = max{W (Pn, Pa)−W (Pn, P̂a),W (Pn, P̂a)−W (Pn, Pa)}
≤W (Pa, P̂a) (4)
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6 Experiments
To evaluate the robustness and effectiveness of our method we apply our model to MNIST, and a
electronic health record (EHR) dataset with lab values for 1.3 million visits of HIV-positive vet-
erans. For an evaluation metric, we use the area under the curve (AUC) of the receiver operator
characteristics (ROC) curve. Using the AUC allows for fair comparison between scoring functions dis-
regarding thresholding for classification. All error bars are 95% confidence intervals. All quantitative
experiments were run over 3 initialization seeds for all models.
We compare our Lipschitz anomaly discriminator (LAD) with the following methods for anomaly
detection: Adversarially learned One-Class Classifier (ALOCC) as in [23], Autoregression for
Novelty Detection (AND) [15], One Class Deep SVDD (DSVDD) as in [5], Robust Convolutional
Autoencoder (RCAE) as in [13]. Convolutional Autoencoder using reconstruction error as score
(CAE) [11], Denoising Autoencoder using reconstruction error as score (DCAE) [24], Local Outlier
Factor (LOF) [2], OC-SVM as in [3], and Isolation Forest (IF) [4].
All networks were constructed to match the number of parameters between autoencoder and discrimi-
nator based models [5] within 1%. See Appendix B for more precise details on network structure.
For other methods we use the default sklearn implementations. When a contamination parameter
is present, we optimistically set it to the known amount of training contamination. LOF, IF, and
OC-SVM are representative of common low-dimensional methods. RCAE, CAE, and DCAE models
represent reconstruction error approaches to anomaly detection.
Artificial Data We first test on artificial data generated from two interleaving half circles using
the sklearn.datasets.make_moons function with noise = 0.05. Figure 2a shows a scatter plot
of the data. To get an idea on the behavior of the anomaly scoring function we show the scoring
function for an autoencoder (Figure 2b) and LAD (Figure 2c) densely sampled on the grid. The
autoencoder uses reconstruction mean squared error as a scoring function, LAD uses f as defined in
equation 3. The autoencoder learns to reconstruct the data, but also many points outside of the data.
Poor reconstruction outside of the data is only indirectly optimized and not guaranteed. LAD on the
other hand optimizes for a function that is explicitly minimized in low density regions around the data,
so we are guaranteed that points far away from the data are scored as anomalies (see Proposition 1).
(a) Input Data (b) AE Reconstruction Score (c) LAD (ours) Score
Figure 2: Depicts the anomaly score over the plane of an autoencoder reconstruction model and
our lipschitz anomaly discriminator trained on sklearn.datasets.make_moons data (Red = more
normal, blue = more anomalous). Reconstruction is a poor proxy for data density.
Robustness to Reconstruction Difficulty Because some points may be easier to reconstruct than
others, methods based on a reconstruction score may misclassify datapoints that are easy to reconstruct
as nominal, or those that are difficult to reconstruct as anomalous. For illustrative purposes we examine
the 28×28 grayscale image that is all black. This image is not near to any point in the nominal dataset
for any of the digits but is very easy to reconstruct. We compare the anomaly score of the black
image to the anomaly scores of the nominal test images by computing the rank of its score within the
nominal test data. For training on the digit ‘0’ we train the model on all ‘0’s in the training set, and for
testing we compute the score of the black image relative to that of the 1,000 test ‘0’s, with higher rank
being more anomalous. We would expect this image to be more anomalous than any of the images in
the test dataset (have a rank of 1). In Table 1 we can see that models based on reconstruction error
considers the all black image as less anomalous than many or most of the test digits. Autoregressive
6
Digit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 mean
ALOCC [23] 0.351 0.015 0.199 0.194 0.204 0.216 0.164 0.121 0.160 0.060 0.168
CAE [11] 0.017 0.395 0.010 0.001 0.014 0.001 0.053 0.083 0.091 0.002 0.067
DCAE [24] 0.001 0.149 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.299 0.126 0.059
DSVDD [5] 0.757 0.480 0.136 0.368 0.917 0.273 0.847 0.571 0.627 0.736 0.571
LAD (ours) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
RCAE [13] 0.023 0.418 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.033 0.049
AND [15] 0.426 0.023 0.895 0.294 0.143 0.216 0.011 0.561 0.071 0.063 0.270
IF [4] 0.587 0.818 0.035 0.324 0.123 0.001 0.235 0.271 0.365 0.363 0.312
LOF [2] 0.876 0.986 0.140 0.625 0.765 0.330 0.961 0.865 0.509 0.895 0.695
OCSVM [3] 0.916 0.977 0.355 0.498 0.668 0.259 0.803 0.863 0.553 0.873 0.677
Table 1: Shows the mean anomaly rank of the black image in the nominal test data. Scores are in
[0, 1], with 1 as the best. Scores are measured on the MNIST test set of each digit trained on the
uncorrupted training set for each digit over 3 seeds. Since the black image is inherently easy to
reconstruct, it receives a low anomaly score in reconstruction based models.
Train Corrupt. 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10
ALOCC [23] 0.694 0.511 0.514 0.498 0.521 0.539 0.505 0.495 0.504 0.504 0.509
CAE [11] 0.965 0.925 0.898 0.887 0.876 0.868 0.859 0.851 0.844 0.837 0.832
DCAE [24] 0.967 0.925 0.899 0.886 0.874 0.865 0.857 0.850 0.842 0.834 0.829
DSVDD [5] 0.748 0.788 0.748 0.750 0.729 0.718 0.746 0.725 0.703 0.710 0.696
LAD (ours) 0.940 0.937 0.933 0.933 0.926 0.923 0.921 0.917 0.911 0.905 0.901
RCAE [13] 0.957 0.934 0.906 0.894 0.881 0.870 0.861 0.854 0.845 0.838 0.832
IF [4] 0.853 0.853 0.849 0.845 0.844 0.837 0.836 0.832 0.829 0.827 0.822
LOF [2] 0.973 0.958 0.918 0.873 0.830 0.789 0.762 0.745 0.730 0.718 0.709
OCSVM [3] 0.954 0.895 0.867 0.853 0.840 0.828 0.819 0.812 0.806 0.800 0.794
Table 2: Shows the mean AUC over digits over 3 seeds for training set corruption levels from 0% to
10%. For deep methods (top) and for non-network based methods (bottom).
Novelty Detection (AND) [15] and Deep-SVDD [5] perform well relative to other reconstruction
based methods. AND uses an autoregressive score in addition to the reconstruction score, suggesting
that this score is more robust to reconstruction difficulty. Deep-SVDD uses a network with no bias
parameters, so the all black image (all zeros) always outputs the origin, so is extremely dependent on
the choice of center c. Here we use a center of 0.1n as suggested in the code, which is relatively close
to the origin.2 LAD consistently ranks the black image as most anomalous for all digits showing
robustness to variability in reconstruction difficulty.
MNIST Training Set Contamination Next we test on the MNIST handwritten digit data (see
Table 2 and Figure 3). Here we split the data in the same way as [20, 21]. Previous work considers
the mean AUC over classes trained on each one of the 10 digits. We consider the same with one
additional variable, the amount of training set contamination pi ∈ [0, 0.10]. To contaminate the
training data for a given digit, we add random samples from the training data of the other 9 digits
to the training data until we reach the correct fraction of training set contamination. To create the
corrupted training distribution P̂a, we take 4× 4 patches of the image and shuffle these in random
order. This more closely models the anomaly distribution, i.e. the other digits, than a gaussian noise
corruption. To evaluate each model we use AUC over the entire test set containing 10,000 images
1,000 of which are the nominal class. Most methods perform quite well on a training set that only
contains nominal data. Local outlier factor (LOF) outperforms all deep methods for ≤ 1% training
contamination. Since LOF uses a k-NN approach with the sklearn default of k = 20, once there are
a few anomalous points in the training set, its performance degrades rapidly. As the contamination
increases above 1%, LAD performs the best in terms of AUC on the test set showing its robustness to
training set contamination. This is justified by Prop. 2.
EHR Lab Value Application To establish usability in the medical setting, we test our model on
health record data (see Fig. 4). Health record data represents a large source of data that is error prone,
2https://github.com/lukasruff/Deep-SVDD
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Figure 3: Shows the area under the receiver operator characteristic curve (auc) of various anomaly
detection models with varying levels of training set contamination on MNIST data. For contamination
> 1% our model (LAD) outperforms all other deep models.
and difficult to cleanse of anomalies for training purposes. Here we use the veterans aging cohort
study (VACS) dataset.3 A collection of 1.3 million clinic visits by over 28,000 HIV-positive veterans.
10 HIV relevant lab values were chosen and normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. To
establish a set of known nominal vs. anomalous points we use those clinic visits with a Creatinine
lab value > 2 standard deviations away from the mean in this case > 4.30 mg/dL as anomalous. This
number is well above the reference range for normal patients [35], indicating that these patients
have high risk for renal disease. We split our data into 80% training and validation set, and 20%
test set. To vary the training set contamination we add a given percentage of the high Creatinine
values to the nominal training set. In Figure 4 we can see the AUC performance of various deep
models on this task. Since adding even a small amount of high Creatinine lab values encourages an
autoencoder to represent these values, and thereby all other anomalous values, reducing performance
for reconstruction error based models. While adding up to 3% training set contamination our model
robustly detects these high Creatinine anomalies.
(a)
(b)
Figure 4: (a) Shows input data embedding with PHATE [36] colored by Creatinine in mg/dL. (b)
Shows the area under the receiver operator characteristic curve (auc) of various anomaly detection
models with varying levels of training set corruption. Our model LAD outperforms all other deep
models on this task.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we introduced the first Wasserstein-distance based deep anomaly detection framework.
We show the advantage of our discriminator-based framework, which learns to reason about the
probability density of the nominal data and produces an anomaly score based on distribution distances,
as opposed to other deep methods that rely on reconstruction-error criteria. While reconstruction error
may be tangentially related to distance from distribution, it is not directly measuring a distribution
distance. As a result, reconstruction methods may learn to reconstruct “averaged images” that are not
3https://medicine.yale.edu/intmed/vacs/
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part of the training data, and further, they will likely be able to reconstruct any outliers that are part
of the training data due to the sensitivity of MSE loss to the worst-case training point. By contrast,
our method, the Lipschitz anomaly discriminator, provides guarantees on points with low support in
the training data. Furthermore, we can show that LAD significantly outperforms existing methods on
slightly corrupted unsupervised training data, which is more realistic than assuming anomaly-free
clean training data. Using a Lipschitz discriminator framework creates a more robust deep anomaly
detection framework, fusing the ability of neural networks to capture complex structure with the
robustness given by traditional distance-based anomaly detection. We demonstrate the performance
of LAD on MNIST and electronic health record datasets.
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A Proofs of Propositions from Section 5
This section is dedicated to proofs of propositions that appear in Section 5.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. First, we recall from Theorem 5.10 (iii) of [34] that since Pn and Pa have compact support
f∗ exists, and from Theorem 5.10 (ii) of [34] that pi-almost surely, f∗(x)− f∗(y) = ‖x− y‖, and
therefore also pi-a.s., f∗(y) = f∗(x)− ‖x− y‖. Now, let
A = {y : ∃x ∈ Sn s.t. f∗(y) = f∗(x)− ‖x− y‖},
and let Ac be its complement. Then, clearly by definition, for any (x, y) ∈ Sn ×Ac we must have
f∗(y) 6= f∗(x)− ‖x− y‖, and thus pi(Sn ×Ac) = 0. Therefore, by the equality of marginals (and
since Sn is the support of Pn, we have Pa(Ac) = pi(Sn ×Ac) = 0, which yields Pa(A) = 1. Thus,
for Pa-almost every y we can write f∗(y) = f(x′)−‖x′− y‖ for some x′ ∈ Sn. Finally, since Sn is
compact and f∗ is continuous, we can set C = maxx∈f∗(x) f∗(x) and clearly have both f∗(x′) ≤ C
and ‖x′ − y‖ ≥ infx∈Sn{‖x− y‖}, which yields the result in the proposition.
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A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Let R be the diameter of Sn defined as supx,y∈Sn{‖x− y‖}, which must be finite since Sn
is compact, and let x0 ∈ Sn be a point where f∗ reaches its maximum value, which was chosen as C
in the proof of Prop. 1. Then, since f∗ is a Lipschitz-continuous function, then for every x ∈ Sn we
have 0 ≤ C − f(x) ≤ ‖x − x0‖ ≤ R, thus, f(x) ≥ C − R, and together with Prop. 1 we get the
result of the corollary.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let A = ∣∣Ex∼Pn [f∗(x)− f∗∗(x)]− Ex∼Pa [f∗(x)− f∗∗(x)]∣∣. Then, we can write
A = ∣∣Ex∼Pn [f∗(x)− f∗∗(x)]− Ex∼Pa [f∗(x)− f∗∗(x)]∣∣
=
∣∣(1− γ)Ex∼Pn [f∗(x)− f∗∗(x)] + γEx∼Pn [f∗(x)− f∗∗(x)]− Ex∼Pa [f∗(x)− f∗∗(x)]∣∣
=
∣∣Ex∼(1−γ)Pn+γPa [f∗(x)− f∗∗(x)]− Ex∼Pa [f∗(x)− f∗∗(x)] + γA∣∣,
which forms an geometric series. Therefore, for γ < 1 we get
A = 1
1− γ
∣∣Ex∼(1−γ)Pn+γPa [f∗(x)− f∗∗(x)]− Ex∼Pa [f∗(x)− f∗∗(x)]∣∣.
We now examine the f∗ and f∗∗ portions of A separately. By reorganizing terms we can write
A = 11−γ
∣∣Af∗ +Af∗∗ ∣∣ with
Af∗ = Ex∼(1−γ)Pn+γPa [f∗(x)]− Ex∼Pa [f∗(x)]
= (1− γ)Ex∼Pn [f∗(x)] + γEx∼Pa [f∗(x)]− Ex∼Pa [f∗(x)]
= (1− γ) (Ex∼Pn [f∗(x)]− Ex∼Pa [f∗(x)])
= (1− γ)W (Pn, Pa)
and
Af∗∗ = Ex∼Pa [f∗∗(x)]− Ex∼(1−γ)Pn+γPa [f∗∗(x)]
= −W ((1− γ)Pn + γPa, Pa).
Returning to combining these together applying the triangle inequality we get
A = 1
1− γ
∣∣Af∗ +Af∗∗ ∣∣
=
1
1− γ
∣∣(1− γ)W (Pn, Pa)−W ((1− γ)Pn + γPa, Pa)∣∣
≤ 1
1− γW (Pn, (1− γ)Pn + γPa),
which proves the proposition.
B Network Architecture and Parameter Details
In all experiments we use the Adam optimizer [37]. For our Lipschitz models we set β1 = 0. For all
others we use default optimizer parameters, lr = 0.001, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999 and  = 1× 10−8.
For our image based comparisons, we use a simple convolutional autoencoder (see Table S2b for
details) with Leaky-ReLU activations. For our Lipschitz anomaly discriminator we use a simple
convolutional discriminator architecture designed to approximately match the number of parameters
used in the autoencoder model (see Table S2a) for details. For the Deep-SVDD comparison, we use a
similar model as in Table S2a, but without bias parameters (as required in Ruff et al. [5]). For our
ALOCC implementation we use the same architectures as below for the denoising autoencoder and
discriminators. For all models we train with batchsize = 128, and 20,000 batches.
Code reproducing these results is implemented in Keras and will be made available at https:
//github.com/anonymous/project.
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Layer Output Shape Param #
Dense (None, 256) 2816
LeakyReLU (None, 256) 0
Dense (None, 128) 32896
LeakyReLU (None, 128) 0
Dense (None, 64) 8256
LeakyReLU (None, 64) 0
Dense (None, 1) 65
Total params: 44,033
(a)
Layer Output Shape Param #
Flatten (None, 10) 0
Dense (None, 128) 1408
LeakyReLU (None, 128) 0
Dense (None, 96) 12384
LeakyReLU (None, 96) 0
Dense (None, 64) 6208
LeakyReLU (None, 64) 0
Dens) (None, 10) 650
Dense (None, 64) 4160
LeakyReLU (None, 64) 0
Dense (None, 96) 6240
LeakyReLU (None, 96) 0
Dense (None, 128) 12416
LeakyReLU (None, 128) 0
Dense (None, 10) 1290
Total params: 44,666
(b)
Table S1: (a) Dense Lipschitz Network architecture used by default. (b) Dense Autoencoder
architecture used by default.
C Existing methods with no training set corruption
While it is difficult to compare neural network based models, especially with different architectures,
most papers make no attempt to do so fairly. Given the amount of hyperparameter tuning possible
in deep networks, it is difficult to distinguish real advancement, from models that either allow for
more careful tuning, or were tuned more carefully. Given that, we note that recent models such as
AnoGAN [17], Deep-SVDD [5], OCGAN [17], and RCAE [13], that were specifically designed for
the anomaly detection task, even with extensive hyperparameter tuning, barely outperform (if at all)
the Local Outlier Factor model [2] with default parameters in sklearn [38].
Table S3 compares models based on numbers extracted from other papers. For Deep-SVDD, AND,
and OCGAN we used numbers directly from the original papers. For CAE, DCAE, RCAE, IF, LOF,
OCSVM we use our own numbers generated from standard sklearn implementations.
We can see that with no corruption, our model performs poorly relative to others on digits such
as 3 and 5. We note that other distance based methods, IF, and KDE also have problems with the
same digits. This suggests certain datasets may be consistently more difficult for distance based
methods. However, on other datasets distance based methods would be preferred, i.e. those with
some corruption.
D Why Use Corruption instead of a Generator?
As mentioned in Section 4, we use only the discriminator from a WGAN to classify anomalies.
The discriminator maximizes discriminatative power between two distributions. In a GAN, this
is the training distribution and the generated distribution. In Figure S2 we show the discriminator
function over the plane after the generator has neared convergence. Here red means not enough of the
generated / corrupted distribution, and blue means too much of the generated / corrupted distribution.
When the generator is nearly converged, the discriminator starts to pick up very subtle differences
in the generator distribution and the true distribution. This is not what we want, as we do not care
about the difference between the generated distribution and the true distribution, only the density
of the true distribution. This occurs when the generator is powerful enough to model the training
distribution well. Thus, we use a simple corruption process, which can be thought of as an extremely
weak generator to model only the training distribution.
A very weak generator could potentially also be used, however, we since we found simple corruptions
that perform quite well and give theoretic guarantees, we did not explore this area further.
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Layer Output Shape Param #
InputLayer (None, 28, 28, 1) 0
Conv2D (None, 14, 14, 16) 272
LeakyReLU (None, 14, 14, 16) 0
Conv2D (None, 7, 7, 32) 8224
LeakyReLU (None, 7, 7, 32) 0
Conv2D (None, 4, 4, 64) 32832
LeakyReLU (None, 4, 4, 64) 0
Flatten (None, 1024) 0
Dense (None, 64) 65600
LeakyReLU (None, 64) 0
Dense (None, 64) 4160
LeakyReLU (None, 64) 0
Dense (None, 1) 65
Total params: 111,153
(a)
Layer Output Shape Param #
InputLayer (None, 28, 28, 1) 0
Conv2D (None, 14, 14, 16) 272
LeakyReLU (None, 14, 14, 16) 0
Conv2D (None, 7, 7, 32) 8224
LeakyReLU (None, 7, 7, 32) 0
Conv2D (None, 4, 4, 64) 32832
LeakyReLU (None, 4, 4, 64) 0
Flatten (None, 1024) 0
Dense (None, 10) 10250
Dense (None, 256) 2816
LeakyReLU (None, 256) 0
Reshape (None, 4, 4, 16) 0
Conv2DTranspose (None, 8, 8, 64) 16448
LeakyReLU (None, 8, 8, 64) 0
Conv2DTranspose (None, 16, 16, 32) 32800
LeakyReLU (None, 16, 16, 32) 0
Conv2DTranspose (None, 32, 32, 16) 8208
LeakyReLU (None, 32, 32, 16) 0
Conv2D (None, 32, 32, 1) 257
Cropping2D (None, 28, 28, 1) 0
Total params: 112,107
(b)
Table S2: (a) Lipschitz Network architecture. (b) Convolutional Autoencoder architecture.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mean
LAD (ours) 0.984 0.992 0.920 0.917 0.921 0.871 0.971 0.942 0.928 0.945 0.939
CAE 0.996 0.999 0.946 0.940 0.971 0.945 0.992 0.979 0.901 0.985 0.965
DCAE 0.997 1.000 0.957 0.930 0.972 0.968 0.990 0.976 0.899 0.986 0.967
RCAE [13] 0.996 0.999 0.930 0.928 0.967 0.921 0.994 0.973 0.885 0.984 0.958
DAE 0.894 0.999 0.792 0.851 0.888 0.819 0.944 0.922 0.740 0.917 0.877
VAE [39] 0.997 0.999 0.936 0.959 0.973 0.964 0.993 0.976 0.923 0.976 0.970
GAN [40] 0.926 0.995 0.805 0.818 0.823 0.803 0.890 0.898 0.817 0.887 0.866
AnoGAN [17] 0.966 0.992 0.850 0.887 0.894 0.883 0.947 0.935 0.849 0.924 0.913
DSVDD [5] 0.980 0.997 0.917 0.919 0.949 0.885 0.983 0.946 0.939 0.965 0.948
AND [15] 0.993 0.999 0.959 0.966 0.956 0.964 0.994 0.980 0.953 0.981 0.975
OCGAN [21] 0.998 0.999 0.942 0.963 0.975 0.980 0.991 0.981 0.939 0.981 0.975
IF [4] 0.969 0.995 0.751 0.837 0.876 0.752 0.874 0.906 0.737 0.883 0.858
LOF [2] 0.997 0.995 0.952 0.972 0.969 0.979 0.998 0.977 0.917 0.976 0.973
OCSVM [41] 0.988 0.999 0.902 0.950 0.955 0.968 0.978 0.965 0.853 0.955 0.951
KDE [42] 0.885 0.996 0.710 0.693 0.844 0.776 0.861 0.884 0.669 0.825 0.814
Table S3: Shows performance of existing anomaly detection methods on MNIST task using results
from original papers if given split into network based (Top) and non-network based (Bottom).
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Figure S1: Shows the AUC across digits of all models with 95% confidence error bars over 3
seeds. Some digits are more difficult than others Our model does particularly well on the digit 8,
outperformaing all other models by a significant margin on all training set corruptions tested.
Figure S2: Shows a WGAN-GP trained against a generator and against corruption. When the
generator nears convergence, the discriminator becomes less meaningful. We use a simple corruption
process so that the discriminator meaningfully models the distribution.
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